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Abstract 
 
Recently, researchers and reporters have made a wide range of claims about the 
distribution, nature, and societal impact of political polarization. Here I offer reasons to 
believe that, even when they are correct and prima facie merely descriptive, many of 
these claims have the highly negative side effect of increasing political polarization. This 
is because of the interplay of two factors that have so far been neglected in the work on 
political polarization, namely that (1) people have a tendency to conform to descriptive 
norms (i.e., norms capturing (perceptions of) what others commonly do, think, or feel), 
and (2) claims about political polarization often convey such norms. Many of these claims 
thus incline people to behave, cognize, and be affectively disposed in ways that 
contribute to social division. But there is a silver lining. People’s tendency to conform to 
descriptive norms also provides the basis for developing new, experimentally testable 
strategies for counteracting political polarization. I outline three.  
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Introduction 
“I am whatever you say I am. […]  
In the paper, the news, every day I am.” 
(Eminem) 
 
In the wake of tense public debates on Trump’s presidency, ‘Brexit’, the rise of populist 
parties, climate change, Covid-19, and many other hot-button issues, political polarization has 
become an important topic in psychological, political, and interdisciplinary research (Nisbet, 
Cooper, & Garrett, 2015; Maher, Igou, & van Tilburg, 2018; Mason, 2018a; Iyengar & 
Massey, 2019; Talisse, 2019; Hart, Chinn, & Soroka, 2020). In research publications and/or 
media reports on political polarization especially in the U.S. and Europe, claims such as the 
following are common: 
 
 
(1) “Political polarization [in the U.S. and Europe] is on the rise.” (Maher et al., 
2018, p. 205) 
 
(2) “Ordinary Americans increasingly dislike and distrust those from the other 
party.” (Iyengar et al., 2019, p. 129) 
 
(3) “European elections expose polarized British public.” (Shackle, 2019) 
 
(4) “U.S. liberals and conservatives not only disagree on policy issues: they are 
also increasingly unwilling to live near each other, be friends, or get married to 
members of the other group.” (Brick & van der Linden, 2018) 
 
(5) “[A]ffective [political] polarization is acutely present in European party systems, 
as partisans are often extremely hostile towards competing parties.” (Reiljan, 2020, 
p. 1) 
 
(6) “U.S. citizens are more inclined than ever to regard the ideas of their political 
opponents as not only misguided, but as a significant threat to the well-being of the 
nation; they are also more likely to regard citizens who affiliate with an opposition 
party as unintelligent, dishonest, and immoral.” (Talisse, 2019, p. 95) 
 
(7) “90% [U.S. Americans] believe their country is divided over politics and 60% 
feel pessimistic about their country overcoming these divisions.” (Heltzel & Laurin, 
2020, p. 179) 
 
Table 1. 
 
The statements in Table 1 and indeed just a brief Google search on political polarization 
indicate that researchers and reporters writing on the topic tend to agree that especially in the 
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U.S. and (Western) Europe political polarization is widespread and/or widely perceived to be 
so (Maher et al., 2018; Iyengar et al., 2019; Carothers & O’Donohue, 2019; Klar, Krupnikov, 
& Ryan, 2019). Researchers also typically concur that while it might in some cases be rational 
or even beneficial (Shi et al., 2019; Becker et al., 2019), overall, political polarization is 
ethically, epistemically, and politically problematic (Iyengar et al., 2019; Talisse, 2019). It is, 
for instance, thought to lead people into political ‘echo chambers’ that make them more 
extreme in their beliefs and choices (Sunstein, 2009), susceptible to ‘fake news’ (Iyengar & 
Massey, 2019), reluctant to accept science (Nisbet, Cooper, & Garrett, 2015), and unwilling to 
respect their political opponents as equals (McCoy, Tahmina, & Somer, 2018). This may 
contribute to political deadlock in policy-making on some of the most pressing issues of our 
time (e.g., climate change; Van Boven, Ehret, & Sherman, 2019). As Talisse (2019) puts it 
(with focus on the U.S.), 
 
politics is more divisive than ever, and severe political divisions are undermining 
democracy. Ironically, that’s the one thing upon which everybody seems to agree. 
Lamentations over our political divides are commonly accompanied by related warnings 
concerning political ‘bubbles,’ ‘silos,’ and ‘echo chambers’; these are said to produce 
‘intellectual closure,’ ‘groupthink,’ ‘spin,’ ‘derp,’ ‘post-truth,’ and forms of 
‘derangement.’ (p. 95) 
 
In the following, I will largely set aside whether such ‘lamentations’ and the kind of claims 
about political polarization illustrated in Table 1 are accurate. Instead, I want to focus on an 
issue related to them: What social effects might such (written or oral, possibly correct and 
prima facie merely descriptive) statements about political polarization by researchers and/or 
reporters have on an audience?  
 
I shall offer reasons to believe that many of these statements – henceforth ‘polarization claims’ 
– fuel political polarization. This is because of the interplay of two factors that have so far been 
neglected in the work on political polarization, namely that (1) people have the tendency to 
conform to descriptive norms, i.e., norms capturing (perceptions of) what others commonly do, 
think, or feel (Cialdini, 2003, p. 105; Prentice, 2007, p. 629), and that (2) polarization claims 
often communicate such norms. Due to the interplay of (1) and (2), many polarization claims 
incline those receiving them to behave, cognize, and be affectively disposed in ways that 
increase social division. But I argue that there is a constructive side to it too: People’s tendency 
to conform to descriptive norms also provides the basis for developing hitherto unexplored, 
experimentally testable strategies for counteracting political polarization. I outline three.  
 
They are, just as the overall argument of this paper, indirectly supported by an extrapolation 
from studies on descriptive norms about phenomena other than political polarization. So far, 
there are no studies on descriptive norms directly testing the effects of polarization claims. This 
paper is intended to stimulate social and political psychologists to start empirically investigating 
the connections between political polarization, polarization claims, and descriptive norms. 
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The relevant type of political polarization 
When it comes to the concept of political polarization, psychologists and political scientists 
distinguish between “affective polarization” and “ideological polarization” (Webster & 
Abramowitz, 2017; Mason, 2018b; Iyengar et al., 2019). Affective polarization refers to people’s 
aversive feelings, dislike, and distrust toward others with the opposite political orientation 
(Webster & Abramowitz, 2017). Interestingly, studies suggest that affective polarization is only 
inconsistently grounded in policy-related attitudes (Mason, 2018b). For instance, Democrats 
and Republicans have been found to dislike and distrust their political opponents as persons 
while in fact not disagreeing much with them over substantive policy issues (e.g., abortion or 
gun control) (Mason, 2018b; Iyengar et al., 2019). Affective polarization is thus distinct from 
ideological polarization, i.e., the division between political opponents with respect to their 
policy-related views (but the latter might feed into the former, see Webster & Abramowitz, 
2017). 
 
I will here focus on affective polarization. This is because it strikes me as particularly socially 
detrimental. After all, mutual dislike and distrust among political opponents reduce their 
willingness to search for compromises on, for instance, policy issues, thus undermining any 
potential bridge over ideological divides. Mutual antipathy among political opponents is also 
particularly likely to increase the “sorting” of society into politically homogenous groups, 
creating fertile breeding ground for group polarization (Bishop, 2008; Mason, 2018a; Talisse, 
2019), which occurs when like-minded members of a deliberating group move toward a more 
extreme viewpoint in whatever direction is indicated by their pre-deliberation tendency 
(Sunstein, 2009). Affective polarization is thus especially important to explore and tackle. It 
will occupy center stage in the discussion here. i In the rest of the paper, the term ‘political 
polarization’ will refer primarily to affective polarization. 
Characterizing polarization claims 
In the debate on political polarization, polarization claims are common. To clearly specify these 
claims (as I understand them here), they have the following five key features that will become 
important below. First, polarization claims tend to be or are perceived as authoritative and are 
readily endorsed by the audience. For they include statements by researchers with the relevant 
expertise (e.g., political psychologists), informed non-experts (e.g., BBC science reporters), 
and credible academic experts with less relevant expertise (see also “expert trespassing 
testimony”; Gerken, 2018, p. 299). Relatedly, these claims can be found within academia, for 
instance, in journal articles, but also outside of it in the media, TV, newspapers, and so on.  
 
Second, polarization claims might be about the de facto distribution of political polarization, or 
about people’s perceptions of (i.e., their beliefs about) it (e.g., “90% U.S. Americans believe 
their country is divided over politics”; Heltzel & Laurin, 2020, p. 179). These perceptions 
might be accurate or inaccurate.  
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Third, notice that polarization claims generally ascribe socially problematic features to people. 
As illustrated in Table 1, they attribute, for instance, the property of being polarized, 
distrustful, unwilling to be friends with political opponents, etc. to members of a social group.  
 
Fourth, polarization claims often involve broad generalizations about groups (e.g., people in 
the U.S./Europe, liberals, partisans, Republicans, etc.) either without explicit quantifiers (e.g., 
‘some’) or with wide-scope quantifiers (e.g., ‘most’) or >50% percentiles to describe the 
reference class. When they don’t involve explicit quantifiers, they capture principled assertions 
about a social category as a whole (e.g., people in the U.S./Europe, ‘ordinary Americans’, 
etc.). Importantly, studies found that people tend to construe statements referring to whole 
social categories strongly as conveying that (almost) all members of the category display the 
feature at issue (Cimpian, Brandone, & Gelman, 2010). Hence, polarization claims often 
communicate that most members of a given group display certain properties. I shall call this 
feature of these claims genericity.  
 
Finally, polarization claims tend to invoke a temporal dynamic: ‘political polarization in the 
U.S. and Europe is on the rise’, ‘ordinary Americans increasingly dislike and distrust those from 
the other party’, etc. indicate that polarization is becoming more prevalent. I shall call this 
feature of many polarization claims dynamicity. Some polarization claims involve a static framing 
(e.g., ‘Affective polarization is acutely present in European party systems.’). But since various 
studies are taken to show that political polarization is in fact increasing, many polarization 
claims do display dynamicity (see, e.g., Iyengar et al., 2019). Below I argue that given their 
genericity and dynamicity, polarization claims communicate a particular kind of social norms to 
an audience. The next section introduces these norms. 
Descriptive norms 
In psychological work on social norms, researchers distinguish between prescriptive (or 
injunctive) norms, which capture (perceptions of) what ‘ought’ to be the case or to be done, 
and descriptive norms, which capture (perceptions of) what people in a particular group 
commonly do, think, or feel (Cialdini, 2003, p. 105; Prentice, 2007). ii  Examples of 
prescriptive norms would be that people should love their neighbors, or that politicians should 
be honest. Examples of descriptive norms would be that bakers get up early, or that most 
students are on social media.iii Both types of norms have an influence on people’s behavior. 
Descriptive norms are thought to motivate by “providing evidence as to what will likely be 
effective and adaptive action”, the underlying rationale being that if most members of a group 
are doing it, in the group, it must be a sensible thing to do as they do (Cialdini et al., 1990, p. 
1015).  
 
There is much evidence that people tend to conform in their behavior and cognition to 
descriptive norms when they learn about them. For instance, studies (including naturalistic field 
experiments) found that when told that a majority of others do so, people are more likely to 
increase (or reduce – depending on the majority’s behavior) their own energy consumption, 
littering, recycling, water conservation (Schultz et al., 2007; Goldstein et al., 2008; Mortensen 
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et al., 2018; Lede & Meleady, 2019), tax paying (Hallsworth et al., 2017), acceptance of an 
employment decision (Coffman et al., 2017), voting turnout during elections (Gerber & 
Rogers, 2009), healthy eating (Staunton et al., 2014), use of stereotypes (Duguid & Thomas-
Hunt, 2015), display of corrupt behavior (Ko ̈bis et al., 2015), and even willingness to steal 
(Cialdini et al., 2006). Interestingly, there is some evidence that people conform to descriptive 
norms about others’ behaviour even when they do not politically identify with these others 
(e.g., a Democrat being inclined to follow a popular behaviour amongst Republicans), 
suggesting that a “general desire to conform” to descriptive norms and others may “out-power 
the common in-group vs. out-group mentality” (Pryor, Perfors, & Howe, 2019, p. 1).  
 
Additionally, and importantly, even descriptive norms that people explicitly reject have been 
found to still lead them to behaviorally and cognitively conform: “explicit egalitarians” 
reminded of the descriptive norm that men are more likely to be leaders than women were 
subsequently less likely to treat a woman seated at the head of a table as the group leader than a 
man in the same position (Porter & Geis, 1981, p. 52; see also Peters, 2020a, p. 17). Finally, 
studies suggest that even when they learn about descriptive norms in other individuals’ groups 
and these norms are morally problematic (e.g., making babies cry), people (children and 
adults) still tend to express more disapproval of non-conforming (vs. conforming) members of 
these groups (Roberts, Ho, & Gelman, 2019, p. 382).  
 
To be sure, holding that descriptive norms always elicit such reactions and conformist 
responses in all domains might be unwarranted (Richter, Thøgersen, & Klöckner, 2018; 
Paryavi et al., 2019). However, recent literature reviews (John et al., 2019) and several meta-
analyses have found strong evidence of the predictive validity of descriptive norms in intention 
formation and behavior guidance across a wide range of domains (Rivis & Sheeran, 2003; 
Melnyk et al., 2019). Moreover, descriptive norms turn out to be significantly more effective 
than prescriptive norms (Melnyk et al., 2019).  
 
There is a particularly powerful type of descriptive norm that will be relevant below. Notice 
first that some kinds of descriptive norms aren’t only about prevalent features among people, 
but also about collective increases of these features in a population (Sparkman & Walton, 2017). 
An example would be a norm expressed in a claim such as ‘Increasingly more people have 
smartphones’. Generalizations about collective increases in a particular characteristic or 
behaviors in a population (which might be a minority) have been called ‘dynamic norms’ 
(Sparkman & Walton, 2017; Mortensen et al., 2018). Dynamic norms pertaining to majority 
trends can be viewed as a subset of descriptive norms because they refer to features most 
people increasingly exhibit. I shall call norms that refer only to majority features without also 
indicating trends static descriptive norms. And I will call norms that refer to majority features 
while also indicating trend information dynamic descriptive norms.  
 
Studies suggest that dynamic descriptive norms can have a stronger impact on behavior than 
static descriptive norms both when the two norms push in different directions or in the same. 
For instance, in a naturalistic setting, when Sparkman and Walton (2017) told lunch goers that 
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percentage of people who bought lunch without meat, as compared with a static descriptive 
norm condition and a control condition. Similarly, when Sparkman and Walton equipped some 
washing machines in college laundries with a message indicating that students are changing, 
with most now using full loads, they found that students used these machines 29% less over the 
next three weeks (compared to the preceding three weeks). Machines displaying only the static 
descriptive norm that most students do their laundry with full loads were used only 10% less. 
Notice that the pronounced efficacy of trend capturing dynamic norms has been independently 
confirmed in other studies (see Mortensen et al., 2018; Loschelder et al., 2019). 
 
Since descriptive norms, in general, have been found to have significant effects on behavior and 
cognition (e.g., intention formation, stereotyping, etc.; Rivis & Sheeran, 2003; Duguid & 
Thomas-Hunt, 2015) that are often stronger than those of prescriptive norms (Melnyk et al., 
2019), it is unsurprising that they have been explored in research on how to tackle various 
social problems (e.g., environmentally unfriendly behavior, etc., Lede & Meleady, 2019; 
Sparkman & Walton, 2019). However, descriptive norms haven’t yet been related to the 
specific issue of political polarization and polarization claims. 
Polarization claims convey descriptive norms 
As noted above, polarization claims often involve generalizations conveying what socially 
undesirable behavioral and/or cognitive features most people in a particular group (e.g., people 
in the U.S. and Europe, ‘ordinary Americans’, liberals, etc.) have. This means that due to their 
genericity, polarization claims often communicate descriptive norms. In fact, since polarization 
claims often displays not only genericity but also dynamicity, they often convey dynamic 
descriptive norms, namely norms about what features members of particular political groups 
(e.g., people in the U.S. and Europe, liberals, etc.) commonly and increasingly more exhibit. 
That is, polarization claims often convey norms that incline an audience to align their own 
behavior and information processing (e.g., stereotyping, disapproval, etc.; Duguid & Thomas-
Hunt, 2015) to these norms.  
 
To make this more concrete, consider again the examples from Table 1. The preceding 
discussion provides reasons to assume that the statements in Table 1 incline at least some 
political opponents in the audience (e.g., people in the U.S./Europe, ‘ordinary Americans’, 
the British public, liberals, European partisans, etc.) to become more polarized, increase their 
dislike and distrust towards their political opponents, become more unwilling to live near 
them, increasingly view their ideas as misguided, become more ready to believe that their 
country is divided over politics, feel pessimistic about a change of this situation, and so on. The 
support for these assumptions comes from the studies mentioned earlier which suggest that 
descriptive norms, particularly, dynamic descriptive norms, tend to drive people to align 
themselves with them in their behavior and attitudes in various domains even when they 
capture negative features (e.g., unhealthy eating, stereotyping, stealing, corruption, etc., 
Staunton et al., 2014; Duguid & Thomas-Hunt, 2015, Cialdini et al., 2006, Ko ̈bis et al., 2015).  
 
There is other experimental work that can be viewed as lending support to the view that 
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polarization claims themselves have polarizing effects. For instance, Levendusky and Malhotra 
(2016a) had their study participants (U.S. Democrats and Republicans) read one of three 
newspaper articles: an article describing the electorate as deeply polarized, an article depicting 
the electorate as moderate, and a non-political article. Afterwards, participants were asked 
questions measuring (inter alia) their own affective polarization (e.g., rating of the other party 
on a ‘feeling thermometer’, listing things they disliked about the other party, or reporting how 
comfortable they are having friends voting for the opposite party). In their responses, 
participants exposed to depictions of a polarized electorate subsequently displayed more 
affective polarization. Levendusky and Malhotra don’t consider descriptive norms yet. But their 
findings are as expected if the above proposal on how polarization claims might increase 
political polarization is correct. For according to that proposal, when the study participants 
read that the electorate is divided, they learned about a descriptive norm capturing polarization 
among Democrats and Republicans that they then conformed to (Democrat vs. Republican 
subjects differently), resulting in an increase in their own affective polarization.  
 
To further corroborate the proposal that polarization claims might fuel political polarization, 
notice too that these claims are widely broadcast by authoritative sources (in the media, 
newspapers, TV, etc.) and typically refer to very large demographic groups (e.g., U.S. citizens, 
European partisans etc.). This doesn’t only mean that recipients of polarization claims are 
frequently in the reference set of the claims and likely to readily believe them (due to their 
authoritative source). It also raises the prospect that the descriptive norms indicated by 
polarization claims might additionally drive individuals who are still politically neutral or 
moderate to take up a position politically or become more extreme, respectively. They might 
(consciously or unconsciously) reason: ‘if everyone dislikes their political opponents these days, 
that might be a good way to fit in’. 
 
Having said that, the extent to which people are influenced by descriptive norms is likely to 
depend on the extent to which they self-identify with the group at issue in the norms. For 
studies found that group norms about a certain behavior (e.g., regular exercise) influenced 
people’s intention to act in line with a group’s norms “only in subjects who identified strongly 
with the group” (Terry & Hogg, 1996, p. 195). The effects of descriptive norms captured in 
polarization claims are thus likely to be a function of the degree to which the person identifies 
with her political identity. The claims’ contribution to further polarization should then be more 
pronounced for individuals who more strongly identify with the group at issue (e.g., the 
political ‘extremes’ on both sides).  
 
Indeed, in research on social norms, social identity is thought be tied to group properties and 
behavioral standards such that strong self-identifiers perceive a lack of conformity to group 
norms as a “threat to the legitimacy of the group. Self-categorization accentuates the similarities 
between one’s behavior and that prescribed by the group norm, thus causing conformity as well 
as the disposition to control and punish transgressors” (Bicchieri, Muldoon, & Sontuoso, 2018). 
That is, strong self-identifiers are not only much more likely to conform to the group’s 
descriptive norms but also to make efforts to ensure that other group members do so too. 
Descriptive norms and their effects on behavior can thus be viewed as properties of groups and 
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social identities.  
 
It should be noted too, though, that some of the studies mentioned above (e.g., Robert et al., 
2019) suggest that even when it comes to people who do not identify with the group 
mentioned in polarization claims (e.g., politically neutral individuals), upon exposure to these 
claims, these individuals too are likely to expect members of the groups who are at issue (e.g., 
liberals, Republicans, Europe partisans, etc.) to act in norm-consistent ways. And these 
expectations can bias their social interactions with the targets: if you expect someone to be 
politically polarized that might lead you to act in a more aloof way toward her, potentially 
causing her, in turn, to become hostile toward you (Stinson et al., 2009; Bicchieri, 2017, p. 
135), which increases social division.  
 
Finally, as Iyengar et al. (2019) emphasize, unlike with respect to race, gender, and other social 
divides where group-related attitudes and behaviors are subject to social norms of civility and 
tolerance, there are no corresponding social “pressures to temper disapproval of political 
opponents. If anything, the rhetoric and actions of political leaders demonstrate that hostility 
directed at the opposition is acceptable and often appropriate” (p. 133). If hostility toward 
political opponents is socially tolerated and often appropriate, and if people learn that this 
hostility is widespread, this might also make them feel relieved of responsibility for it, 
unleashing political aversion even further (a ‘moral licensing effect’; Blanken, van de Ven, & 
Zeelenberg, 2015). In sum, there are good grounds to believe that polarization claims are likely 
to fuel political polarization via the impact of descriptive norms on people’s behavior and 
information processing.  
The silver lining, or unexplored ways of tackling political polarization 
Since political polarization drives people apart, it is clearly socially harmful (Sunstein, 2009; 
McCoy et al., 2018; Talisse, 2019). It thus becomes important to explore possible strategies of 
reducing it. I want to suggest that while people’s tendency to conform to descriptive norms, 
particularly dynamic norms, can lead them to respond to polarization claims in ways 
exacerbating political polarization, the same tendency also provides the basis for potential 
interventions to reduce political polarization. These interventions are experimentally testable 
but have so far not been considered in the psychological and political science literature. I shall 
outline three.  
Recycling dynamic norms 
As noted, dynamic norms have been found to be stronger than static descriptive norms in 
eliciting conformity no matter whether they capture minority trends (e.g., ‘increasingly more 
people limit their meat consumption, but most still eat too much meat’) or majority trends 
(e.g., ‘increasingly more students conserve water when doing their laundry; most already do 
so’) (Sparkman & Walton, 2017; Mortensen et al., 2018). Indeed, when Mortensen et al. 
(2018) told a group of students that only 48% of their fellows engaged in water conservation 
behavior but that this figure had increased from 37% two years before, these students 
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themselves subsequently displayed more water conservation behavior than controls and 
students only presented with the minority norm. The dynamic framing ‘buffered’ the 
detrimental effect of the minority norm, which indirectly conveyed a negative descriptive norm 
(i.e., that most students don’t conserve water). If we apply these points to polarization claims, 
then communicating dynamic norms capturing minority trends about political polarization 
might help reduce it. For instance, there is evidence that an increasing minority of the U.S. 
population worries about, and are willing to tackle, political polarization (Parker et al., 2019). 
Given this, consider the following rephrasing of one of the polarization claims from Table 1: 
‘U.S. citizens are more inclined than ever to regard the ideas of their political opponents as 
misguided and a significant threat to the well-being of the nation, but a growing minority of 
them make an effort to moderate their views about the ideas of their political opponents.’ If 
minority trend information can weaken the detrimental effect of negative static descriptive 
norms (Mortensen et al., 2018), then polarization claims of this type hold the potential to 
decrease political polarization. 
Acknowledging variations in the data 
To reduce the likelihood that polarization claims fuel political polarization, those 
communicating about the latter might also add explicit scope-restricting quantifiers such as 
‘some’ or ‘many’ when describing members of groups. Such scope restrictions can undercut an 
audience’s generalization of the claims to all or most members of a group, which lowers the 
probability that the claims convey descriptive norms. Granted, when the quantifiers needed in 
the polarization claims to describe groups are ‘most’ or ‘all’, the same descriptive norms 
related problem as before will arise. However, even though it is often suggested that political 
polarization is pervasive and increasing, several studies indicate that this might be an 
exaggeration (Cavari & Freedman, 2018; Westwood, Peterson, & Lelkes, 2019; Tappin & 
McKay, 2019). For instance, in experiments with more than 6000 people, Klar et al. (2018) 
found that although some Americans are indeed affectively polarized, many “more simply want 
to avoid talking about politics. In fact, many people [e.g.] do not want their child to marry 
someone [even] from their own party if that hypothetical in-law were to discuss politics 
frequently” (p. 379). Klar et al.’s and other surveys suggest that only about 20% of U.S. 
Americans are truly affectively polarized (for references, see Klar et al., 2019).  
 
Yet, about 90% U.S. Americans believe their country is divided over politics (Heltzel & Laurin, 
2020, p. 179). They perceive much more polarization than actually exists (Levendusky & 
Malhotra, 2016b). This is an instance of a well-documented phenomenon known as “false 
polarization”: people tend to overestimate the extent of polarization between their in-group vs. 
out-groups (Pronin, Puccio, & Ross, 2002). Relatedly, studies found that when it comes to 
their perceptions of, say, how many people dismiss anthropogenic climate change, people tend 
to “grossly overestimate the numbers” (Leviston, Walker, & Morwinski, 2013, p. 334) and 
display “pluralistic ignorance”, a phenomenon occurring when most individuals privately reject 
a view but falsely believe that most others endorse it (Prentice & Miller, 1996). Crucially, 
research suggests that when people believe most others dismiss/accept climate change, this can 
make them become less/more likely to believe in it themselves (Goldberg et al., 2020). These 
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points provide reasons to suspect that the broad generalizations in polarization claims 
concerning the actual distribution of polarization are often exaggerate too, and can then be 
replaced with more restricted quantified claims (involving, e.g., ‘some’ or ‘many’) without 
becoming inaccurate.  
 
Additionally, communicating that the vast majority of people overall (i.e., independently of 
political identity) is in fact not aversive against their political opponents can help decrease 
political polarization too. For, as noted above, people’s tendency to conform to descriptive 
norms of an overall population has been found to out-power even the common political in-
group vs. out-group (e.g., Republican vs. Democrat) mentality (Pryor et al., 2019). Notice, 
however, that some researchers who aim to correct misperceptions about the pervasiveness of 
political polarization use polarization claims to the effect that people only widely believe that 
polarization is common (see, e.g., Klar et al., 2019). The problem with this seemingly 
innocuous strategy is that such claims themselves convey descriptive norms, namely about what 
people commonly believe. Assuming that the preceding argument is correct, this means that 
these claims too can have a negative consequence: they contribute to the proliferation of these 
inaccurate beliefs. It is thus worth keeping in mind the importance of acknowledging variations 
in the data even when it comes to reports on people’s mere perception of political polarization. 
 
Finally, the strategy of noting variations also coheres well with and can be further motivated by 
research on intergroup conflict resolution. Studies in that area of work suggest that perception 
of out-group homogeneity, i.e., the view that members of an out-group are all alike, is 
common in inter-group conflicts and a significant hindrance to inter-group reconciliation 
(Lederach, 1997). Increasing the perceived diversity of an out-group has been found to 
decrease levels of generalized negative beliefs about the out-group and to significantly boost in-
group members’ openness to the out-group’s views (Čehajić-Clancy et al., 2016). Since an 
explicit acknowledgement of variation in the data on polarization (e.g., only some U.S. white, 
middle-class conservatives genuinely increasingly dislike liberals) may facilitate an audience’s 
perception of diversity in political out-groups (e.g., conservatives), this point lends 
independent support to adopting the strategy at issue. 
Utilizing negativity 
To consider a final suggestion on how to reduce political polarization via descriptive norms, 
Bergquist and Nilsson (2019) conducted a study involving descriptive norms containing 
negations, i.e., “descriptive don’t-norms”, which pertained to, e.g., environmentally friendly 
action such as choosing an energy-efficient light bulb vs. avoiding an energy-inefficient. 
Bergquist and Nilsson found these norms to be stronger in eliciting conformity than descriptive 
norms containing affirmatives. This is plausibly explained by the fact that survival requires more 
urgent attention to possible bad outcomes, which are indirectly captured in what most people 
do not do or try to avoid, than to good outcomes (Bergquist & Nilsson, 2019; Baumeister et 
al., 2001).  
 
Suppose we combine this point with the preceding consideration that in fact only a minority of, 
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e.g., U.S. citizens is strongly affectively polarized and most of them are not (Klar et al., 2019). 
Consider the following statement rephrasing claim (6) from Table 1: ‘While many U.S. citizens 
are more inclined than ever to regard the ideas of their political opponents as misguided and a 
significant threat to the well-being of the nation, overall, most of them do not do so and try to 
avoid excessive antipathy towards the ideas of their political opponents.’ If people are more 
sensitive and responsive to descriptive don’t-norms, then statements of this kind should offer 
another way to counteract political polarization. 
Limitations  
The proposals and arguments introduced in this paper draw on data from various psychological 
studies on descriptive norms. The data pertain to other phenomena than political polarization 
and so do not offer direct support for the points made here. So far, there is no experimental 
study directly testing the effects of descriptive norms in the context of polarization claims. 
Indeed, while descriptive norms have recently been investigated in some politically relevant 
domains (e.g., voting behavior or policy activism; Gerber & Rogers, 2009; Hassell & Wyler, 
2019) and with respect to different political in-group vs. out-group orientations (Pryor et al., 
2019), there is yet no mentioning of descriptive norms in the literature on political 
polarization, in particular.  
 
While the reliance on data from other studies is a limitation of the preceding discussion, it is 
worth highlighting that the reviewed findings on descriptive norms come from studies covering 
a wide range of different domains, and we have little reason to assume that the domain of 
polarization claims is an outlier in the here relevant respects. Since that is so, it would be 
surprising if in the context of polarization claims, the conformity effects discussed did not 
occur. While future empirical testing might show otherwise, for now, the studies mentioned 
lend indirect support to the proposals and overall argument offered. The paper achieves its goal 
if it prompts experimental investigations of the connections between descriptive norms, 
polarization claims, and political polarization. 
Conclusion 
Scholars working on political polarization, including political psychologists, have not yet 
considered the implications of studies on descriptive norms for their own theorizing. Similarly, 
psychologists working on social norms and investigating descriptive norms have not yet 
explored the issue of political polarization. The two areas of research, i.e., the work on 
political polarization and the work on descriptive norms, have here been connected for the first 
time. The main upshot is disconcerting: many claims about political polarization in journal 
articles, at conferences, in the media, etc. display features (genericity and dynamicity) in virtue 
of which they convey a particular kind of descriptive norms that incline people to align their 
behavior, cognition, and affective dispositions to these norms. Since polarization claims capture 
generalizations linking political groups with negative features (e.g., antipathy, closed-
mindedness, hostility, etc.), the resulting conformity effects are socially detrimental, fueling 
political polarization. I noted, however, that there is a silver lining: the process underlying the 
	 13	
problematic effects at issue also offers a basis for developing ways of counteracting political 
polarization that have so far not been explored in the literature. I proposed three that involve 
re-formulations of polarization claims. Since political polarization has been shown to be at the 
heart of some of the currently most pressing social problems (e.g., political hatred, science 
skepticism, climate change denial, and tackling Covid-19; Nisbet, Cooper, & Garrett, 2015; 
Mason, 2018a; Goldberg et al. 2020; Hart et al. 2020), the proposals offered here introduce an 
important area for future experimental investigations.iv  
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i Having said that, many points I will make below can be extended to ideological polarization. It is, 
however, not obvious that this applies to all of them. For instance, data by Levendusky and Malhotra 
(2016a) suggest that there are important differences. Assessing these differences is an interesting open 
question for future research. 
ii Notice that there are different notions of descriptive norms in the literature. For instance, Bicchieri 
(2017) defines them as “a pattern of behavior such that individuals prefer to conform to it on condition 
	 20	
																																																																																																																																																														
that they believe that most people in their reference network conform to it” (p. 19). Here I adopt 
Cialdini et al.’s common notion. 
iii Philosophers might balk at the use of the term ‘norm’ for these behavioral regularities. This is 
standard terminology in psychology, however, and I shall thus adopt it. 
iv The argument proposed here also raises many normative, philosophically interesting questions 
related to the ethics of science communication. For instance, to what extent do the points made here 
with respect to polarization claims also hold for other kinds of social scientific claims found in 
communication between scientists and the public? And do scientists have a moral responsibility for the 
kind of effects discussed? I explore these questions elsewhere Peters (2020b). 
